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PREFACE 
This study encompasses a period which was probably 
'the most significant in American steamship history -- from 
the hurtling of the GENERAL SLOCUM (1904) to 1925• It is 
not tin.usual tor a major disaster to touch off a broad 
. ' 
investigation into problems not necessarily directly related 
.to the. disaster itself. Thus, such studies provide data 
I 
of interest 1n a general study; this is why the present 
paper deals so heavily in events while stressing trends. 
Beoause of the range of some of these investigation reports, 
a problem presents itself as to the ·proper soope a paper 
on "fire safety" should have. 
Our considered opinion after working 1n the a11.bject is 
that 1 t was necessary to study a;J.l aspects of safety cov.ered 
in the contemporary investigations. As this paper progresses 
into the stuqy of the period, the justification for this 
position -should become evident.· · 
·were· we· .. to take up a series of studies on the various 
aspects of fire safety, such as inspection, smoke detection, 
or sprinklers, we would have a disjointed thesis. But by 
covering a period of time, we are able to see the topic in 
the light of human reactions and government operations. 
We have taken a period of history which is fairly 
clearly defined and self•l1mit1ng and have taken all 
discussions directly or indirectly relating to factors 
involved in ship fires during that period. 
Obvious starting point is the GENJmAL SLOCUM fire, 
as will be seen 1n first chapter, which taltes up the 
progress of fire safety and American steam.boat inspection 
before this disaster. 
The year 1925 as an end is rather less easily defined. 
For one thing, the retirement of Inspector-General George 
Uhler in that year ended a continuous career at the head 
of safety inspection and thus marks a symbolic "end of an 
era". Another reason for stopping at 1925 is the Clyde 
Steamship Company's rather strange series of fires during 
that year; which are covered in the author's undergraduate 
thesis on the subject at the University of Richmond, 
Further, and most important, any study from 1925 onward 
would of necessity entail topics.which are naturally 
prefatory to the second International Conference on Safety 
of Life a.t Sea. 
CHAPTER I 
.AMERICA!~ FIRE SAFETY BEFORE 1904 
The awesome threat of fire aboard a ship at sea, 
even in this day of wireless and the "fireproof" ship, 
is one of the great fears of mankind. How much more so 
it was when steamers were of wood, unregulated as to 
cargo and construction! Prior to the momentous New York 
harbor excursion boat fire aboard the GENERAL SLOCUM in 
1904, which took 955 lives, public awareness and thus 
Congressional action, on fire safety a.board ships was 
1 
next to nil. Insurers, if not the public and the shipping 
trade, knew early that fire was the main cause of total loss 
of steam.ships at sea; the first transoceanic voyage of a 
partly-steam vessel, the SAVAlillAH, was refused +nsurance 
2 for this reason. 
The first legislative regulation of steamship 
construction related to .fire safety was the Act of July 
7, 1838, which required inspection annually of steamer 
hulls and semi-annually of boilers, but this merely checked 
£or possible explosion danger. Likewise, the Acta of 
March 3, 1843, requiring signal lights and after steering, 
1. James M. Merrill, uThe Day New York Shocked the 
World,,. Steamboat Bill, XVIII (Fall, 1961), 67 .. 73. 
2. Edward N. Hurley, The New Merchant Marine (New 
York: The Century Company, 1920), 14. 
regulated only cases of explosion and collision.3 
Two memorable steamship fires, the. LEXINGTON and the. 
G. P. GRIFFITH, had much effect of a positive nature on 
the e~rliest United States steamer safety regulations, 
2 
so muoh so that they rate discussion here.. First of these, 
a.board the LEXINGTON in Long Island Sound, 1840, was 
important ~n bringing-about the 1843 Acts. The.1838 Act 
had required thr_ee iifeboa:ba on each passenger· steamer, but 
had not called for firefighting tools. perhaps on the premise 
that a ship afire cannot ba saved, but must be a.bandoned. 4 
Investigations of the LEXINGTON fire by authorities caused 
a popular stir, even to the extent that the proceedings 
were published in book f'orm the same month, January 1840.5 
Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt, who had built· the ship 
but said he had sold her in 1838, stated that her boiler 
had had 30% more boiler fastenings than required, was 
. . . 
quoted as making the rather sensational statement that "I 
don't recollect wether she ever took fire -· it is so 
common a thing for a steamboa:b to take fire, that I cannot 
.really remember about. the Lexington". 6 
.. ~ 4. J. H. Morrison, "Fire Protection for Steam Vessels 
and Government Regulations", Scientifi;o An+erican Supplepen~; 
LVIII (July 16, 1904), 23860. . . . 
3 
She hs.d a fire engine, ·but Congress was moved to make 
tur·ther requirements for fire safety; the Congressional 
committe's recom.rnenda.tions included sheet iron lining for 
bo11er rooms, an underlining of sheet lead in the boiler's 
wake• a constant Iire watch, and more sufficient lifeboats, 
but the aotual legislation was far less. 7 
The second of the early fires to bring action was 
that aboard the G. P. GRIFFITH, which burned June 17, 1850, 
lTi th 326 aboard, most ot whom died. ..The GRIFFITH caught 
fire on Lake Erie; lodged on a bar, and was destroyed there. 8 
The SteamboaD Act of August 30, 1852 resulted from the 
stir which foll01red this fire; this Act was the basic lalr 
for steamship safety for over three-quarters of a century. 
Clearance of 18" wao required between any hot boiler, pipes, 
or machinery and any woodwork or other combustible, w·i th 
· free air circulation about any hot metal. Authority for 
organized inspection service was given in the legislation 
by providing for nine supervising inspectors to look after 
the local inspection of lifeboats, life preservers, 
5. AnonY!Il-ous, Loss of the L x nrrtoa (Providences 
H. H. Brown o.nd A. H. Stillwell, 184-0 , 5, 6. 
6~ ~· 
7 • Harrison, .QJ2.. cit. s, 23861 • 
8. Dana Thom.as B.o·hren, Shtpwreclts of' the La.lees: (Daytona 
Bea.ch: Dans. Thomas Bow~n, 1952 , 18-19. 
4 
lioens~g of passenger vessel engineers and pilots, and 
req11ired the stamping of boiler plates by :to cal inspectors 
of boilers after they had approved each plate. The Act was 
successively amended over the yeurs.9 
The 1852 Act was haile~ as a great improvement by 
the inspectors. The supervising inspectors were meeting 
as an informal board to unify their efforts; in 1857 they 
oi tad that there had been appreciable iiecline in loss of' 
life by explosions due to the new laws!0 But fire and collision 
were now the majo~ problem for American steamers. The use 
of hair felt had been tried successfully in 1855, and soon 
came into acceptance. However, it was not ··antil. 1875.}that 
iron deck beams were being used a.round the boiler areas. 11_ 
The first iron-hulled steamer built in the United States 
is thought tb. have been the J,. W. EVERY'iA.N, around 1.850, and 
the first all-steel steamer the IROQUOIS, built in 1886. 
It should be noted here that "e~ll-steel" did not mean that 
the wood components were largely gone, but that the hull and 
major structural members were metai. 12 
Smoking on ships seems to be one of the principal 
fire hazards, then and now. · Tho~gh today there are many 
"no smoking" signs on every ship, there is much suspicious 
· g. Morrison, 9.ll• cit., 23861 ; ~. SBIS Report, 1905. 
10. United States House of Representatives, 35th 
Congress, First Session, Executive Document 3 (Washington: 
1857). 212. 
11. lhli·• 215; .G.t:· Morrison,~· cit., 23861. 
5 
investigation into the place of oigarets in causing a great 
number of steamer fires;· a paper today and one half a century 
ago on the subject might use similar language in regards to 
this ma.tter. 13 
The formation of a formal Board of Supervising Inspectors 
and a Supervising Inspector-General at Washington did not 
elL~inate the evil of paying the local inspectors of boilers 
and inspectors of hulls by the fees they collected t. but 1 t 
did provide an office at Washington~ 14 
The Board submitted to Congress some futile attempts 
et reform of inspection an~ safety for American steamers~ 
One was before Congress.March 29, 19041 just before the 
SLOCUM disaster, but was relegated to the special limbo for 
reforms not under outside pressure~ But on June 15 of that 
year, the SI,OCU:M burned and some few attitudes were to change. 15 
Even after the SLOCUM fire, a- maritime authority,, 
uriting on fire at sea, said: 
"It is one of the risks of the trade; 
and of course every trade has its special risks~n1 6 
Yet another engineering authority, speaking before the 
12. 844 Develo n the World's Mos Ma cent 
Fleet of Ooastw se Steamers a e L ne New York: Pe~ssenger 
Traffic Department, Clyde Steamship Company, 1927), ~' 1~.· 
1 :;. I11Iorrison,,. on • .Ql.t,.; .£!• "Digest of an article 
appearing in the April. 1954 issue of the Scandinavian Insurance 
Quarterly transle~ed py Hans Von He1jne of the Svea•Nornan 
Insurance co., Gothenburg, Sweden" (Mimeographed MS in the 
Library of the Insurance Society, 150 William St., New York). 
'\ 
\ 
,·, 
- ' 
6 
fire, stated that: 
11 the subject • • • has not yet received the 
attention it deserves from shipowners, ship'hrtill\ers. 
underwriters* or,. as a matter of fact, from the 
, 1)ublic authorities controlling our maritime affairs. tt 17 
This samo author ·continues, lashlne; out a·t ·the 
thon~current attitude: 
nrn fact, if only sh1.powners and shipbuilders 
l-TOuld te.ke the matter to heart, they 1-rould find. 
that the moment they really wished to make their 
vessels safer from· :fire, they wou.ld be able to do 
so at a very small cost; whilst, of course, as 
long as they look upon safeguards with d1sfavour'1 18 the extra expense will be described as enormous.' 
14. SBIS Report, 1905. 
15. Lloyd M. Short, Steamboat-InsMcction Service (New 
·York: D. Appleton and Oompany; 1922J, 1 • 
16. Lawrence Perry, trFire at Sea", Ametican Mar;azine, 
LX (October, 1905), 599-608. 
17. Edwin o. Sachs, 11 .b1ire Prevention on Board Ships", 
l._~s~ct!qns of the In~~itution of Nav41 Architects and 
Ma:rine ;§ngineera, XLVI {1904), 273, 27 • 
18. Ip1g., 279• 
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CHAPTER II 
TH.E GEUERAT.1 SLOCtm CASE 
On an overcast-Thursday morning, June 15, 1904, the 
[Oursion boat GENERAL SLOCUM set off for an eventful cruise 
estined to kill 955 before the-burned-out hulk would beach 
tseli' on Little Brother Island just a few miles-Up-New York 
arbor.- The congregation of st. Hark' s Lutheran Church, 
1cnicking aboard, was almost wiped out by the holocaust 
~ich swept the all-wood ship unchecked by any trained crew 
r usable fire gear; the paddle boxes, where the boat's 
ropellors churned the ship on course until bodies jammed 
~em to a halt, were a mass of carnage; the captain paid no 
ttention to the thousands who burned and screamed below as 
e refused to beach even after the SLOCUM was no·thing but 
floating pyre in the middle of the city. Those who jumped 
Lear were little better off, for the life preservers they 
~re mostly were weighted with bar iron or were rotten from 
quarter century in the salt a1r.19 
So horrible uas the incident that it prompted the 
irgest investigation ~to safety of passenger ships since 
lle GRIFFITH and LEXIilGTON cases.. A United States Commission 
tarted to investigate soon after the fire, reporting on 
Jtober 8. The investigators found that the inspection 
19. Merrill; .2Jl• cit. 
8 
certificate llad been sighed in the names of, but not by, 
James A. Dtuuont, inspector of hulls, and Themas H. Barrett, 
inspector of boilers. for the port. The certificate had been 
granted 1~1ay 6, 1904 for the oarryi11g of 2,500 excursioners. 20 
First procoeJlngs to try to find the cause of the f1ra 
. was the coroner's 34nquest at ne1·r Yorlc. It turned out there 
that Dunant an'l Barrett had never actually inspected the 
s{lip. but that an uuderl:lnz, a~3$istant inspeo-'Gor Henry 
Lundberg, had been in charGe of the inspection. Lundberg 
21 
refused to testify. The president of tho firm o·wning the 
SLOOu1{ showed bills for the new life preservers he said 
had been recently bought for the vessel, but it was later 
shown that these were aboard another liner. 22 I·t was also 
shown that the life preseryers actually aboard were :1orn 
out from rot and had been inacoeosible. 23 
Four indictments were handed dorm by the' grand jury of 
the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York on July 24, 1904 under Section 5344 of the 
Statutes at Large, not under the steamboat act. Captain 
William. I!. Van Schs.ic!i: wao indicted for misconduct, 
negligence, and inattention to duty; managing directors 
Frank A. Barnaby, James K. Atkinson, Frank E. Dexter, and 
20. Re2Qht of the Un~ted States Commission o~ 
Inve t C?"at on U on t:he Disaster to the. Steamer "General, 
-Slocum 1 October , 19Q1 Washington: G~vernment Printing Office, 1901~), hereafter referred to as "SLOCUH Comm., 9. 
21. John Wesley Hanson, ed., New York's Awful 
Excursion Boe.t Fire (Melt York: 1904), 250•251. 
22. ~., 246. 23. Ibig., 258. 
John A. Pease 1rnre :?..ndicted to stand trial for aiding and 
abetting him in these offenses. .ll.ssista.nt inspectors 
John w. Fleming and Henry Lundberg were indicted for fraud, 
misconduct, and inattention to duty. Another indictment 
was filed against Van Schaick, Burnaby, Atkinson, Dexter, 
and Pease for aiding and abetting the Knickerbocker 
9 
Steamship Coupany in fraud, misconduct, and inatten·tion to 
duty; Captain Van Schaick was indicted alone for various other 
offenses24 
During the investigations it was found that the life 
preservers had been weichted to bring them up to the required 
six pou..~d weight by inserting bar iron in the cork panels; 
the manufacturers were indicted for con~piring to defraud 
the government and to prejudice the inst;>ection laws. 25 
?resident Theodore Roosevelt, 1.n his preface to the 
investigation reports, said of the bar iron scandal: 
" • • • This last offense was of so heinous a 
~.Jw.racter that it is difficult to comment upon 
1 t with proper self'-restrai12t. It appea.rR ·the 
national legislature has never enactecl a lm·r 
providing in set· terms for the punishment of 
this particular SJ.'ecies of infamy, doubtless 
because it uever entered the head of any man 
that so gross an infamy could be perpetrated ••• 
The u. s. Commission inquiry found that there we..s 
tt26 
• 
"no consideration whatever given to the question of 
inflamma.bili ty. •• The SLOCUH was all of wood, much-painted 
24. SLOCUM Gomm., 61; .£.t• U. S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York cases CR. D-3351, 
CR. D-3354, and CR. D-3354, National Archives. 
25. SLOCUM Comm., 61, 62. 26. SLOCUM Comm,, 4. 
10 
and tinder-dry, and the commission found that "the sole 
protection of such a vessel against fire depends on prompt 
extinguishment at its early inception". Thus, the investigators 
called for better rules on extinguishment equipoent. 27 
Life preser..rers were taken up at length, and the la1-r 
was found sorely wanting. The maximum passenger load limit 
policy was questioned ('limits were set by inspectors), and 
it ·was found that law did not require life preservers for 
all aboard. Ferries were required at that time only enough 
for the average number to be carried, and excursion barges 
in tow needed only 25 to comply with law, no matter how many 
passengers were aboard; to top it all off, the regulations of 
. 8 
quality were found wanting. 2 
On the matter of extinguishing apparatus, stringent 
reformed rules were:. advised by the commission. Cheap linen 
hose then in vogue was found to deteriorate too rap:1.dly to 
offer any practical assurance that there would be hose ready 
to use when needed, and the myriad of couplings in use were 
recommended to be standardized. A requirement to install 
. hand fire extinguishers was recommended; carbon dioxide 
smothering devices for cargo holds were urged if equivalent 
to the then~cnrrent steam systems. The ease of casting off 
27 • SLOCIB-1 Comm. 1 11, 51-52. 
28. SLOCUM Comm., 52. 
lifeboats 1n an emergency situation was also stressed as 
needing refors. 28 
1 1 
Locus of respons1 bili ty we.a taken up by the conm1ssion 
next, and it was found that the ce.ptain L"'l modern times is 
less independent than formerly, uhen captains were more 
than mere enployees of a corporate giant and in many cases 
owned all or part of their ships; the commission wanted more 
responsibility put 011 the 01mers, but wanted the captains 
responsible to the Steam.boat-Inspection Eervic,e on 
conditions a.board the ship and frequency of fire drills. 
~hG investigators further asked that the duties of the 
captain in equ:i..pp:i.nt; a.'l"l.d navigation of the vessel be 
defined in tho light of modern practice, and the responsibilty 
of a charterer actually operating a vei:::sel was questioned. 29 
·rho powel"S, duties, and method.s of pay of the inspectors 
waa alsv scrutinized by the com.rrtissioners. Inspectors, 
they said. should nave the po1·rer to see condemned equipment 
destroyed, with the power to withhold a certificate until 
this io clone. Since re:l:nspect1on was required onlyt.a'J; a 
se.t schedule, the inspectors• po'tiers to reinspect in case 
of suspicious situations was reoom.111ended with threat of 
revooat:i.on for refuse..l. .After the SLOCUH fire, the 
----
28. SLOOUM Corrmi., 53. 
29. SLOCUM Comm., 53-51~, 60. 
12 
Knickerbocker Steam.ship Company hc.d balked tr~ee M.mes on 
requests by the commission to reinspect the GRAND REPUBLIC, 
a sister ship, and finally the inspectors were forced into 
a partial survey \·rhile the ship was ru.i."111L~g. When a danger-
ous state of affairs was found; the owners had flatly 
refused to lay her up or remedy the situation. The commis-
sioners wanted the inspectors to have the right to order a 
fire or boat drill at any tirae and a reinspection at any 
reasonable time. The hull inspector, they:-said, should be 
required to inspect all.compartments and check lights at n1ght.3C 
As to the ectuel methods of inspections, the commission 
ad.vised that inspectors should hand.le each life preserver, 
checlc all hose at a hundred pounds per square inch, and 
check all pumps 1n actual operation; previously the fire 
apparatus had to be checked by both men during the survey, 
but the investigation commission thought that they i::hould 
be permitted to worlc separately to save time. Furthermore~ 
the recommendation was nade that the persons actually doing 
the inspection should sign the inspection certificate.31. 
Third ~mong the intense investigations into steamship 
fire safety in the walte ·of the SLOCUM fire was the meeting 
of the Board 0£ Supervising Inspectors ~eeting called for 
30. SLOOU1~ qomm,J 55, 56. 
31. SLOCUM Comm., 56, 58. 
13 
October 25 which sat through December 15; many x·eports were 
heard regarding rules, and the supervising inspectors looked 
at many types of lifeboats and other devices. The regular 
board m~eting on January 18, 1905 made more recommendations 
for legislation and made some chenges in the regulations.32 
The Supervising Inspector-General'R report for 1905 1e 
a comprehensive l1st1ne of grievances; we will examine some 
of them now. Inspector-General George Uhler' s principe.l 
topic was the fireproofing of excursion boats, a 300' al.l• 
steel one being under 0011struction a-'1J the time. lle asked. 
that this type of construction be ;required.33 
Further flaws in the law were cited by this report, 
many reiterations of previous complaints. The inspectors 
·complained that they were powerless to inspect vessels 
operated by power other than steam under 15 tons displace• 
ment, though steam passenger vassels were controlled 
regardless of size. Uhler stated: 
0 There is no good reason why a vessel propelled 
by motor other than steara should be exempted from 
any of the requirements demanded of a steam vessel, 34 or should be granted privileges ·not accorded others" 
32. SBIS Report, 1905, 19-20. 
33. SBIS Report, 1905, 21. 
34. SBIS Report, 1905, 10. 
14 
Crude oil, whic~ did not enter the SLOCl~I case, 
1ras taken up as a fire hazard in the. :tnspectors' report. 
lJhler pointed out that though it was forbidden as freight 
with passengers aboard, it was permitted as fuel on pas-
senger vessels with the consent of the Secret~ry of Commerce 
and Labor~· .. The Inspector-Gener&..l wanted a mintmu.11 flash 
point of 140° Fahre11hei t req_uired as e. fire sa.fety factor. 35 
Resultant legisla~ion, apprmrcd i:1n.rch 3, 1905 1 amended 
or repealed 21 ·sections of' the ste'lmboci.t laws; unly one-:third 
that many titles were changed lTi thin the next two a·ecades • 
and raost of these were minor by com:parison.36 
The repor·r. of the SLOCU.H com.mission ?-lld the report of 
the Secretary o:f Commerce went to the chairman of the 
House Oommi ttee ,on Merchant M&.rine and Fisheries, Charles 
H. Grosvenor of Ohio, dated January 20, 1905. It included 
eight proposed bills to correct the many problems 0.1scovered 
1n th ~ t~- . t• ti 37 e course OJ. ne inves 1ga ons. . 
But Conc;ress had already been activ·e following the 
SLOCUM fire. .! Congressional Commission to investigate the 
state of the merchant marine had been appointed to report 
·on the general field o.f resulat1on; it h9.d. asked and gotten 
35. SBIS Report, 1905, 16-17. 
36. United States Depa·rtment of Co1mnerce, Laws 
GoverniM, tqe s~eamhofi t-Ins,n~ct1on .s.erv4or (Washington: 
Govern:nent Printing Office, June 24, 1905J. 
15 
a m.onth' s delay in the duo d~te of its report frorl December 
5, 1904 ·to January 5, 1905. T~~e repo:.-t wn.o lntrod.uced 
on January 4. ni th a ninori ty report a ttachecl. Two days 
lcter the Cor.nnission recalled the paper and the included 
sugr:sestetl le13isla·cion in vim1 of developneats (prol:o.bly tllc 
forthcoming Secretary of Co:.:mcrco roport). 38 Outsido of the 
eigb.t bills proposed in the Sec:;."'otary' o report, only t·wo others 
lTere ever reported. OJ1e of thcce, :J GJi.09, to U:!leno. the 
inspection laws on :po.ssengcr lints, wco reported January 
19, passed the Senate February 1, _pac:sed the house Februury 
3 and was signed by Pres1dt.nt 1.rh0odoro Roocovolt Feb~tw.ry 9. 
This act outlined methods for liBtln5 ace, se:c, citizenship, 
and cause of des:th if the passenger were to die on boai .. d. 
The other, "to amend Section lr.472 of the :le-:risoa Str.. tu.tcs 
so as to rer.iove certain restr~ctions upon the transpor·ta t1on 
by steam vessels of gasoline and petroleu.m when carried 
f:1n gas tanks of cars being shipped_] • • " . , was intro-
duo~d January 10. It provided that so long as· there was 
no sparl( in the enr:;ine, cars could be shipped w1 thout ha v1ng 
to drain the gas tanks. Th3 bill passed, with some confusion 
as to when the spark should be turned off, and was signed 
37. . v. ·R. 1'1etcalf, Improvement o.r Laws, Steamboat-
ns act. o Servic ,, House Document 258, 53th Congress t Third 
Session Washington: Government Printing Of"i'ioe, 1905 Jt 
hereafter referred to a~ "Doc 258.u 
38. Con~ressional Record, 58th Congressl Third Session, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905J XXXIX, hereafter 
referred to as "CR 39"• 4, 449, 530. 
16 
by the President dated ?ebruary 17.39 
As will soon be seen, these are ~nthcr ~inor Acts 
compared to what was recommended by i.~a.r1ous investigators;-
the real actio·n on the SLOCUM caoe bills was to come 
between introduction of the Secretary of Comraerce' s letter 
and the President's. approval of reform 1ec;1slat1on on 
Narch 3. The letter was api,roved by the Uouse for 
publication on January 23, thun stE.rting the clw.1n of events 
with the introduction of the ei[;ht bills. The same bills 
were concurrently introduced into the Senate tl1en. 40 
First of the bills considered wac tho propooal to allow 
the -executive cotillllttee,pf the Board of Supervising In-
specters to make interim changes in the reGulatlons of the 
Board at the call of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and 
with his approva.l. This bill parrned both houses i:rt·t;h only 
an amendment requiring suf'f1clent public notice as to the 
d h · , b f t•ne e .1.1y - 41 propose c anges e ore me v 4ig. 
Fees collected for the inspection of ships had formerly 
been the principal source of- inspectors' incomes. The 
second bill was -desisned to elinin.a. te .abuses causecl by 
this systen, settinG the salaries 07 local inspectors based 
39. CR 39, 1817, 1906, 2482, 1274,. 2:411 t 2469, 1907. 
L!-0. GR 39' 1276' 12eo. 
41.. CR 39, 1274, 2053t 240L~, 3632. 
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on fees collected the previous year, defining the duties of 
ess1stant inspectors, and. perm1tting·the Secretary of 
Commerce ·and Labor to transfer assistant local inspectors 
according to need.. Though the bill passed, its intent was 
·warped somewhat with pork barrel additions• As the bill 
at first read, there were to be six groups of inspectors 
with salaries from $1200 to $2500. Grosvenor introduced the 
bill with the statement that "vessels naturally go for in-
spection where inspection is most lax and the premium is 
therefore placed on inferior and improper work , •• 1 " but 
Cincina.tti' s inspectors we're in the $1200 class: before the 
b1.11 could ,pass the .House, the Loutsville and Ciiicinattf 
inspectors were raised to the ~1500 bracket. Representative 
James B. Mann of Illinois attacked the bill by saying 
that it was the same bill which had been defeated the year 
before, " • • • and the GEllERAL SLOCUM disaster has simply 
been used as an entering wedge and as a hammer to put 
through a proposition which I understand originally was 
simp].y to increase the pay of the inspectors." One of 
his a.mend.men ts . was the pay·,· 'raia e • 42. 
After House passage of the b,111 with Louisvi.lle and 
Cino1natt1 pay r~ises, the- senate passed the bill with alt 
the #1200 inspectors getting raises to '$1500. Those_who 
got the increases in pay were the local inspectors of hulls ·and 
42. CR 39, 1274·, 2053, ~561, :2407, 2666. 
boilers for: Bnngor, Haine; Apalachicola, Ploricia; Evans-
ville, Incliana; Memphis, Tennessee; Nashville, Tennessee; 
Burli:agton, Vermont; Gallipolis, Ohio; Wheeling, West 
Virginia; Jacksonville, Florida. l~3 The House concurred. 
Third among the bills was the most c~ll-encom:passing 
of them, which included the pr0Yisio11 already passed on 
gasoline in the ta:nks ·of es.l"'S betne; shipped. Other 
provisions included Et proh:i.bi tion ,?.::_::8.inst assistant in-
specters having interest in a shi"? or ~n e. ps.tent article 
used on 'ships; to perrn.i t open launches to cover thei1• 
inspection certifice:ces n.o a me. tter of pract:tcali ty; to 
pu·t; fifteen-ton r.otor vessels under the penal provis5.ono 
Of the steambo2.t la1m; to allow ap!)eal t.hrou~h the super ... 
vising inspectoJ: to the inspector-general :ln ca.seo of 
suspension or revocatio~ of lice~seo; allow carbon dioxide 
18 
for srnothori'ng firec if ac1eqn8.te; to require henp and cotton 
to be bagged in liJte ma ter1.als to prev-en·t chafing; to require 
aolle~tors of customs to see inspection certificates before . 
g1"ru1ting ships• papers; to incJ,.ude motor vessels in the Red 
and Mississippi Rivers under ·rules of the road for steamers 
elsewhere. 44 
;.~ .. 
--
43. CR 39, 3632, 3773. 
Doc 258, 
19 
This bill ";·;a.3 L"'J.troducecl :fi th the othero 1.n a pc:.ckage and 
reported lri·thout 2.mana~1ent; e.n effort on t.hc !.Iouoe floor to 
m2J~e it cover only v-essels c::.rryill3 passenccrs for hire ua.s 
rejected. There -;1aB consiclerable o:ppocltion to the blll :tn 
the House, 1n.l.t :i:t emer.:;ed from Con,sresz ~rith only 2.n n.~.~.cnd-
men t to m~ke its 1rording the 80.He m~ tho for!!'. Cr bill on 
cu.r1"'iagc of sasolino i::.1 auto 
of tlw four·bh reform bill sub:r..itted., i:rl th m:i.nor ch2nsc frorn 
Secretary llctoalf' s vDrsion. An:.1t~al i:rnpoction i)ccam~ 
oonpulsory and conde'.lllla ti.011 of doiocti Ye ~~c.r 1m~ n.o-:·r to 
be effoctivoly carri0c.l out. T:.ie lesson. loc.:cn~d by tlle 
reinspoction of the GRA.lID RE:PtmLIC ( ::mur~~, p. 12) 1ras. C.:Jplied 
by muk:ln.::.; 1 t po:::sible for tho lns:.wctora to rcvo1:c tho 
cGr"'11:i...ficatc of a. veosel fo:mc~ to bo clcfcctivc bcti:rncn a.lli-iual 
inspections" Life prosm .. "'Vcra ~rere to be provided fol' each 
parson aboard and crl!:1innl action 1·ras provided for willful 
sale of darective lifesaving upparatu3. Tarn charterers 
were nade liable for violations of lalr and re5ulatio:1s on 
ships they operated and the directors and officers of 
corporp;tions 02era.ting ships ;·rere liable for misconduct 
I 
in the operation of thei:.r vessels. An a~endr:ient to require 
that 75%· of the cre1-r of licensed vessels be 19 years of age 
43. CR 39, 1274, 2053t 2407, 2708, 3632, 3773~ 
20 
with three years' exper~ence, but tl\is was rojcc·~ed on the 
groi:mds that such a provision wou.J.G. put the Great Lclces 
u.nder the Seamen's Union. 46 
With the fifth and sixth bills of the series, we see 
an. example of .. 'What was not passed being; Iaoro cloq.uent than 
what was. T"'ne sixth bill, to amencl Sect;ion 1~399 of the 
Revised Statutes so as to place all ves;;;,;ls IJO":rnred in. whole 
or.l:ln part by stoa.m or other mechiner3r and carryinG; passengers 
.for hire under the insp(\)ction lawo, d~d not imss this M.me 
or during the en"'~lre pe11iod ~ovorec.l by ·~LJ.s Dtudy. Tho 
bill died in comml ttee, anci was tho only one o.f tho SI,OCUM 
h7 bills not reported. r 
Omnibus changes in tlle stea11boa t 12::·~:: Hore co-:re:red by 
the fifth bill, which changed corto.in [let;;i.:1.J.:J fro':'l the 
statutes to the luspec·t;ion 3ervica rcgula·~10ns; bonds of 
1nspeoto:rs were abolished because they were 110 1011c;e:r under 
a fee system and no lou3cr handled lfL011ey. One section of 
the bill did not pasa, this being. tile pt.i.rt to allow the 
Board of Superv1siilg Inspectors to cpprove innovations 1n 
boiler fastening and to :;;.llow slll.e.;le rivet1ns of boilers due 
h.8 to advanced methods of construction. · 
The seventh bill, designed to allm·r the inspccto:cs to 
46. Doc 258, 3; OR 39,. 127Lr., 2053, 21!-04, 2405, 2453, 
2891, 3632, 3773. 
47. Doc 258, 4, 13; CR 39, 1274; SBIS Reports. passim. 
48. Doc 258, 4; CR 39, 18201, 1274, 2053; 2406, 2453, 
2708, 3632. 
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determine the number of licensed officars and crewmen a ship 
should carry. 1Iere an attempt to put the 755'° tr~ ined crew 
r;rovision into the bill was partially sn0coscful, with the 
inland river boats exempted, but tho bill itnelf nas not pas-
sed. 49 Another fatality among the bills e,ttached to the 
Secretary of' Commerce report, though ~- t 't'ms not properly a 
SLOCUM. case bill, was a bill for the appointment of a 
commission on marine construct1on.50 
Even with this mortality rate of proposed reform laws, 
1905 ranlts as the high point for the twenty years to follow • 
.At this point, while we are discussing legislation, it is 
appropriate to £ollow the course of some of the laws mentioned 
above. Subsequent amendments to this legislation included: 
March f.7, 1906: 
June 30, 1906: 
to impose more inspectio~ on foreign ships. 
to amend Section 4471 on fire pumps. 
March 4,. 1909: to amend Section 107 of the.Penal Code, on 
illegal fees and Section 282 of the Penal Oode 
on loss of life at sea due to misconduct of 
officers and others. 
July 17, .1914: to anend Section 4474, on carriage of 
crude 011. 
March 29, 1918.: to· amend Section 4472, on petroleum as 
ship's stores. 
~Iarch 2, 1925: . concorninr; 1then the s:parlc in the engine 
of an automobile being shipped raust be put out.51 
49. CR 39, 2404i 3633; Doc 258, 5. 
50. CR 39, 1274; Doc 258, 5, 14. 
51. La.vrs Govet"n1.n.c; the Steamboa t-Inspect:ton Service 1.925. 
CHJ\.PTER III 
FIRE SAFETY .FRO] THE SLOCUH CASE TO LOiffiOH 00lf.P2'!~mrnE 
The Supervising Inspector-Ge~eral's report for 1906 
renewed the plea for regulation on the trannportat1on of 
crude oil, which ·was not to cone until 1914; ao to ·the 
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laws gr0111ng out of the SLOCUH case, ho cnid tl1.ey were working 
i;::') 
well by then.::.>~ 
He stated that the iron fireproof czcurs1on steai.~er 
he had mentioned in 1905 (su.DAn, p. 13) ·as being unde11 
construction had been a succons. This vessel 1m.s the 
J Jl ... HtillS TOWN, built for tra,ffic between Wo.shington s.:!d Norfolk 
during the Jmnest01-m Te1•ecentenary; she wns ot1"1cken from· 
Lloyd 1,s Register of Shipp5.ng 8. fm·r years la tcr as "converted 
to· a lichtcr." In fact, by 1909 she hcd already been s_old 
l 
~uto Argentine. for the coasting ser-vic~; Uhler insisted, 
:iowever, in h:1s :re}?orts, that such construction should 'be 
required by law.53 
Po..1luro of Congrcos to en2.ct. a law imttinc; motor ships 
of similar tvnoo VJ1.der the same rules as ntean vessels rras 
4'.... . 
a running theme of Uhler'o reports throughout the period of 
this study. All motor vessels had to do for officers was to 
52. SBlS Report 1906, 14-15. 
53. Daily Press, Newport News,~De~ember 19, 1952;~ 
n.aut,j..ue.1 ... Q.g.zctte '.• January 27, 191 O; .uBI~--, Report 1906, 1 ::.;-16. 
carry a licensed u Oll0l"a tortt for ca:ptain, even if carrying 
pa.ss~ngers, so lcm.g as they were UYJ.c1.er fifteen tons. Such 
"Operators" needed no .exa.minD.tion. There -::ms no ·nay of 
restricting the number of :passengers a motor ves;;.;el could 
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carry nor ·was there provision for their safety between five 
and fifteen tons. Under five tons, Uhler conplained, a motor 
vessel 1·ras subject to no restrictions whatso·ever.54 During 
this time, the Presiden.t_: appointed a cornnission to susGest 
revision of the safety la1rs, but nothing concrete came of it.55 
The Act of June 9; 1910, not included in the Steamboat-
inspection laws, required license inspection for o:perato:-cs 
of motor vessels, certain safety devices, and revocation of 
the licenses of iTiola tors, but still Section 4399 was not 
changes and motor vessels were not lUlder the steamboat law.56 
Therefore 1 the uninspectad classes of motor vessels were 
drarring trade from the ·smaller inspected steamers; the 
steam.boats were then .further regUlated by a rule which called 
for auf'ficient boats or rafts for all aboard.57 
By 1914, the inspectors still were complaining about 
motor vessels. Uhler called permitt~.ng bouyant cushion as 
the only life preserver required on a motor passenger ship 
1111ttle short of criminal." He statecl that a steam tugboat 
54. SBIS Report 1907, 14. 
55. SBIS Report 1908, 14. 
56. SBIS Report 1911, 14; SBIS Report 1910, 13. 
57. SBIS Report 1912, 14, 18. 
crew was better protected from fire ·than a passenger on a 
motor vessel •. and said. that the ll.o·t; of June 9, 1910 "far 
from meets the proper requirements for safeguarding life 
24 
a11d property.'' He pulled no punches in lashing at the motor 
vessel.lobby. "That upon which the owners of these vessels 
have insisted has not been liberty, but license. and the time 
has come when this matter should be given attention.u5B 
If there was any real general interest during this 
period in fire at sea as a separate safety problem, it 
evidently did not a.r:i>ear in print too conspicuously. The 
Library ·of Congress bibliography of select sour.ces on fire 
:prevention in 1912 carr~~d only three titles on fire at sea 
among 221 listings.59 
Awareness of fire ::.at sea may have been reawalcened by 
the loss of the Canadian ~orthc.rn Steamship Company 
immigrant ship VOLTURNO.at sea October 9, 1913 ·with 136 
lives lost. Let us hear the story from a contemporary: 
11 It:,was early on Thursday morning (October 9) 
th.at fire broke out. ·The vessel's hold was filled 
with terribly inflammable substances, such as 
chemicals, oils, and cotton. Some say that a 
cigarette tb.rown .down a grating s·tarted the blaze; 
others that chemical action prod~ced so-called 
'spontaneous oombu~:tion • • ~ 111 oO 
58. S.BIS Report ·1914;· J9 .. 20. 
59 ~ ·Library of' uon.grea~, Division of ..i31bl1ography, 
.Pelec,t _List ot: References on Fire Prevention, June 12, 1912. 
60. u The Story of the Vol turno ·~ The Outloolt, (October 
25, 1913), 337; Letter, John Loohhead to .Au·thor March 7 1 1963. 
Tt.e role of 1·ilrcless 111 sturui:onin;; a nUJ1~ber of rescue 
vesoels to 2. point in uid-1\tlantic m:~::~ prc.::.sc1l a.Jv the ·~imo 
n.nd todp;y the VOLTURNO fire is ret;8.rcleti. no one of the first 
cJ.enons'trations of what radio c2.:.i :1c if yropei"lY i:ce0.. One 
dcmonstra ted that a •uni tea. ;.fatione oi' the Atlar..tlc' nou 
could .. ce called. together to ecc t any e:Lcrc;cJ.1cy," But, of 
course, there re,na:ins the fs.ct thct t:>G 111.'"cr~ t:cro lcot. 61 
It is 1nterest1n~ to ~oto CXJl~uations fer this loss; 
· one 'directly 0.fterm·.rc~ Hrotc: 
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uHer~ were ca ther·ec1 toc.;c tho:r·, th.si.1lcs to t.:~.e U[;ency 
of the Marconigraph, the finest fleet of liners ever 
aszemblod i.n the .:niddle of tllo ocee.n, c~11 fl tteC. wl th 
the regulation nmnber of boats, but, owing to ·the 
fierqc w:i.nu and furiouo 802., ;:..11 a1J00lutaly r>o·t·iCrless. rr62 
gives s. clue to the proyer ye:::-s:p::cti-;rc. It ~2s oac.:.i notccl 
th t "'"h -rnn,...~:rr ~ ,.,.,... 1 t, c~- .... '.") C'1r·~ ... "l'•J.·· e·~ 0·11lv "u--:o . c~ lJ e An. ... ~.rJ.u_c~C·i:.1, .ea:r y on ne a v.4e, ... u. " ._ 
seamen, not enough (:Pt~m to me.~- ;;.11 :1er boats; she thus 
oarriec1 in only 88 survi v.ors. 6~ 
61. Keith Jameson, SO·? U oat Sea 
(Derby, Conn.: ;».ro:nc.rch Book:::, 19D2 , · 5 • 
62. .Arthur s~nure;.:eo~, lilltnir~:; of, ·V.-:o Vol turnQ. (Lo11do:n.: 
Cassell and Company, Limited; 191.3), 14-4. 
63. Florence Kelley, "Seama11sl11p and Safety," §..uz:iret, 
XXXI (:November 8, 1913) , 154--155 • 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LOUDOH 1913 - 19?.3 
Sinking of the TITJ\J~IC, the "unsinkable 11 aroused a 
. call for a genera.l·conferenoe of seafaring natiions.on 
safe"t:;y of life at sea, whioh was held c.. t London in 1913. 64 
Sc.i_ent:J.fic 1.:.meric:.an; commented that 11 tlu.~ les~on of the 
'Titanic• disaster ho.s been laid uell ·i;o heart; und 1 t ls 
realized that • • • every ship should bf'. made its 01-rn 
lifeboat." With the Int.ernational Conference soon ·bo ope:n 
at London, "the burning of the 'Vol turno' e1agllasizes ·t;he 
necessity for giving the deliber2.tions of -G:i.w.. t ga tb.erinJ; 
26 
the broadest possible scope by includ.:tng the subject oi' fire · 
,.._ 
protection.n?~ 
The fact was th.z. t fire was :i.ncreasj~11t;l;1 tecouiug a 
problem s.bo2.rd. ships. Fic;ures for Britif:)h ships showed that 
casualties generally declined steadily from 1890 to 1913; 
the nUiuber inVOlYing loss Of life declined, L'.llU fire alone 
among all causes for losses of shi:)s increasod. u i3pou·taneous 
combustionH as a cause rose from rra ver;r smc .. 11 ~flgt~J."'c" to 
about 1.5% of fires. ·Figures included: with 3,601 st0aE1el's 
in Brl tish ret;:lstery in 1890, 55 ·we:r·e lo sJv to fi::."e; in 
6l1-. 1loxd' s IJiDt,.£,nc1 8ht.n.r~JJ.~ .G,~f_e~, No. 35 (May 
16, 19 29) ' 759. . . 
65. rt T'.a.o Peril of J?ire a. t Seau 1 Scientific ..:'1.ncr:\can, 
CIX (October 25, 1913), 31 1~. 
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1913, fire clo.i::10d. 131-1- of the 4,062 stea!1rnrs registry listed.66 
·I11spector-Ge:i1o:i...,o.l U:"lle:r 1-ms ri.~~:0;1('; the of:i':!.cial United 
,Ste.tea iielegat0s to the Lendon Cou.fercnce anO. came <.1w::..y 
convinced that -~ueric~.n metb.od,s of inspection were best., but 
he called f'o:c ce1·t:..'..l11 othor reforn.s "beyond. those recommended 
by th~ Confcrcnce.67 
SU.Ii1...'!J.D. tion of ..t~he woric 2.t the Conference nas the 
Interna tlonal Cori..:V.~mtio11 o:n. Sa.f.ety of J..sife at Sea, first 
document of its kind, n ct~te~cnt of proposed rules for 
·safe construction an{l opern ti on of seac;oj_ng ships, which 
waz sub~lt·(;cd to the si;::L.:;i.tory nat:lons for ratification. 
l?rovisio11z i'or f'lro s.:~fot3r \1CT(:~ of a ceneral ll2,ture, mainly 
dealing 1·rit.h construction and procedures. Article 1 2 
· requir·eJ. f:l:rcp:coof bul1\:hcc.a.c not over 131 feet apart wl th 
ii:reproof reccsscn i-:1 tJ'.".OT". r;md fireproof doors through them: · 
ca1\-;o or b8.llnst 1-rhi·Jh cnd.:::m_sered ~mssengers i·ras forbidden 
by iU'-~lolc 55 c .. ncl .A~!..,ticlc 56 r0q_uirecl safety certi.ficatcs 
which ~w'..lld iJG :tsouccl ·by the re,z;:loterins nation of a ship 
to assu:r3 -th:.."'.t it :-r\et intGr?l.r:ttional standnrcls. Regulation 
49 of the c.ppendix: to tho COUYention called for contlnUOUS 
;l'ire pa. trol s..nc~ for nhips under 4, 000 tons to have two 
fire ptltlps, those over that size to h?.ve tb..ree, with two 
water j£its :tn any c.roc. of the ship, sufflcient fire ex--
'tinguishers, at least two in eci,ch ~e.chinery ~~rea along with 
66. Sir Westcott s. Abell, "Sea Casualties s.nd Loss of 
Life" (galley proofs), (Newoastle-Upon-Tyne: Northeast Coast 
Institution of Engineers and Shipbuilders, 1921), galleys 
3·, 4, 5. 
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two sets of smoke heL"Ilet and safety lam:p; ~o.ch nct1on was 
to inspect for fire sai'oty yearly. Ho1·rever, the si.fety 
regulations did not e.pply to ar.~'" but vesnels carryinr; over 
twelve passengers two hundred miles from shore.GB 
An exa.m}?le of' the enthusiasm over the results of the 
Conference is the statement of E. T Cha '&.. 1 1 i · • ml..1er a n n_. 
introduc~nt.1; the Convention to the Society of Naval Arch1tocts 
and Marine Engineers: 
11 T'l.le London Convention furnishes an j.1rrnetus 
to h1rh o-r-:irlr.. co,.,st;"llCt·ion T-·oT'k .,.., · .... 11,.,+ ;L"'· t"l"lf'\ll"r'(•~· 
- ::.:,) (_)-... (;.., "4 ..._, "'•-'•I ...... J ,;.., •'- t J ,., .. --l... J ..... ~ \J,,._ ~. V + U ,.- ,._ \,. ... .._, I..,...._.... , hJ 
for such worlc international reoogn1 tion." b9 
.A:ny enthusiasm for forthcoming unj.form international 
safety regulations was dashed, howev-er, by the Great Uar. 
As a result of hostili·ties, ·~he Convention was never 
ratified by all the signatories and thus never went into 
effect; no nation completely ado,pted the rcquirerients of 
the ag,-reernent unila. terallY• '(O . 
The report of the Supervisinc: ·rnspector-Gener8.l for 
the following year after the Conference shows the actual 
progress, or laclt of 1 t, since the GENER./L"L SLOCUI1 fire, 
ten,years before. u1iler remarked that a travelling 
-·--
67. SBIS Report 1915, 29. 
68. ·United States Senate nocuncnt 463, 63rtl 0 1)ngrosa, 
Second. Session ( ln appendb: to :~i~.\\otlone __ o.{_t!.1~_soc:Lety of 
Nava1 Jl,tc}J.1 tects...rulllli.&.~:r:.1I1§ ...... :eynr:\ng .. ~±:.§., XXI.L, 220, 230, 252, 
272, 216l. 
69. .E. T. Chamberlain, "International Ooni'erenoe on 
Safety of Life at Sea", Transao1!lons o: the Societz of Naval 
Arch* ~e.,cts e.~d Ma~:t...ne En,gineerl2_; XXII, l. 
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inspector had just startccl work Emd hud uncovered E!everal 
bad inspections, but was being rez;ard'11 ruefully by t!ic 
shipmn:1ers as a C.etectiv·e. The report continuer:: 
"While 1·re have been fortlmate ln not havi:ac any 
great fires recently on e~i:curs1on st0am~r9, 1 t 1~ 
a. peril which none the lesn ex:tsts, £c1d thou~> 
we may he~ve any number of regulations in regard to 
fire-firshtint?; equipment, in orcJ.cr to prevent ouch 
another disaster as occurred on the steamer 
GeneraJ 0 1ocum +11 "·' ber.-·G·· i .. r~~y ., ..... ~.<l r~oy····o·rl"'I t 11('.'\ 
............. ..__......._:~ - u ... v .:J f~ .... , -.)...) v ,i... v"""' .. """ 
cause for such a disaster and require absolute 
fireproof construction of o=curalon stca~crs. 
'fill.is can not be. done until Congress acts, and 
the Dureau'moat earnestly invites ettontion to r 1 the necessity for legislation in this res1)ect." 1 
Uhler went on to examine other snfety m~tters in regards 
to changes in ste.tut·e; 11hich he felt necessary, 1nclud1n.~ 
a new motor vessel law tha.t would be easier to under-
stand and coverage of fire law to cover freighters. He 
wanted more control over dangerous cargoes and over 
passengers on ferries; further, he asked for a plan of 
oentralized approval of proposed ship plans by a boe.rd 
of. a.rch1 tects 11i W_?-shington. . :None of these were now 
recommendations; in fact, all dated to the SLOCUH fire 
and hefore. 72 
A disaster in Chicago brought the steamship safety 
laws and inspection service under scrutiny next, and though 
· 70 •. Board of Trade, Sa.fetx ,of Ltfe_ at Sen (London: 
II. H. Stationery Ofi'ioe, 1927), 5. 
71. SBIS Report 1915, 20, 31. 
72. SBIS Report 1915, 30-34. 
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1 t is not a. fire ITta tter, if results could be r:rnz.sured, 1 t 
probably had ao much 1veicht in publj.c c.ttituc.es as eny 
other disaster in relation to :::o.fcty. .~!..:\DTL:!.l:D, e.n. e::·· 
ours ion boat, had capsized while being towed. a1my from 
her berth in mid-city laden with 2,500 picnickers. Her 
1913 oertiflcate·had rated her for 600 panaengers and a 
limit for excursion of five milen from shore; ho't'rever, Grand 
Haven and Chicago luepeotors had allowed her to cross the 
lake with four times tha·t number. At the hearings, her 
architect called her 11 born a greyhound ancl died a i1olf," 
·and said, "speed was the csoence of the contrcct, and 
ca.rryin5-ca.pac1 ty a soconde.ry cons1.clero.t1011." It 'ims 
also found th~~t, by sone chance, the water ballast tanks 
had been eu.pty an{l inoperable, mak:i.~i.s her unstable. 73 
Inv.estlgationc of t.he disaster 1.ncluded t',. Oook County 
grand jury, a :?cdcral erand jury, 2, coroner's inquest, 
Steamboa:t-Inspectlon 3orv:lce investi:;atlon, awl a separate 
of Conr:tcrcf'.:l l'Till:te.n O. Reel.field. 74 
Inngector-Gcnoral Uhler' s neJ..:t report pointed out 
tha·t excursioulsts h9.d become a:ware that the steamers they 
were ridlng w0ra ovarloaded, but he maintained that the 
local i"'.lspectors, 1cnowin5 the ship, were best qualified 
---· .... 
73. "Chicago's Supreme Tragedy", I1he Litera.If D:);p~est, 
LI (~ugust 71 1915), 231-233. 
711.. "The 1'iastlend Inon1ry11 t !PJlr.OHt.lQ..Q.Ji;., CX (August 
25 1 1915), 939; (August 1a; 19151, 88~. 
31 
set the passenger limit. The bureau at the time of his 
1916 report was preparing legislation to present to 
Congress 1n the spring of 1917.75 
Changes in the steamboat law somewhat more satis-
factory to the Inspection Servioe were made as a result 
of the investigation toward better handling overloading. 
Under the system, a supervising inspector checked on a 
local inspector, and any local inspector in doubt 
' 
became able to call in an Inspection Service stability 
expert; still the law applied only to passenger ships, 
leaving freight steamers still outside most safety lawa.76 . 
The EASTLAND disaster focused more attention on 
hul.l inspection and architectural examination of plans 
to assure proper stability.77 The Board of Supervising 
Inspectors ruled in January 1922 that inclining tests 
should be run on all major size vessels; the Supervising 
Inspector-General repeated a request he had made before 
for some sort of beard of naval architects at Washington 
to examine plans for stability and remove the cost of 
inclining the vessels themselves. Inclining tests,.for 
want of such a board; continued to be made on many shipa.78 
75 •. SBIS Report 1916, 29. 
76. SBIS Report 1917, 24. 
77. SBIS Report 1919. 18. 
78. SBIS Report 1922, 22, 23; 1925, 1. 
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The old proplem of jurisdiction over motor vessels 
by the. Inspection Service kept cropp.ing up. . Though 
motor boat aots had been passed, they were vague and 
inadequate; the In~pector..:General questioned his own 
r 
autho·r1 ty ·over lagre motor ships· and asked a clearer 
•' ' : . . 
control act in 1920; in 1924. the Board of Supervising 
. . 
Inspectors assumed suoh jurisdiction on the basis of 
certain. vague wordinga, , .)f'hioh the solioi tor of' the Board 
questioned as to appl1oability.79 
79. SBIS Report 1924, 21; 1920t 25. 
33 
CHAPTER V 
TRElNDS OF EXPERT OPINION DURING THE PERIOD 
Geo~ge w. Wylie. of the_ O~yde-Mallory Steam~h1p 
Company, speaking at the Sixth National Safety Congress, 
1916, listed the important.developments of the.previous 
few years thus: 
(A) The International Oonferenoe o~ Safety of Life 
· ·at Sea (supra, P• 27) · 
(B) · The Seamen's Act . 
(C) The Conference 01f ~!a.king Passenger Vessels 
More Secure frq~ Destruction by Fire (infra) 
(D) Reports of th~ Supervising Inspector-General 
(E) The Report of the EASTLAND Investigation 
Commission lsttora, P• 30 ). Bo . 
Other than the meeti~gs and investigations already 
mentioned, there was one particularly important conference 
~011oerned exolusively with fire, held in the office of the 
Secretary of.Commerce in 1916. 81 
Secretary ReO..field presided at the meeting with 
representatives of shipbuilders, shippers, Olmers, the 
Navy, and the seamen; though the conference was very 1n-· 
form.al, a transcript was fortunately ta.ken. The Secretary 
Bo. George w. Wylie, "Safety First in Coastwise 
Shipping", National Safety Congtess Proceedings (New 
York, September 14, 1917), 599. 
81. "Advisory Conference on the Subject of Makinw 
Passenger Vessels More.secure from Destruction by Fire 
pamphlet (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916) 
hereafter referred to as "Advisory Oonferedoe". 
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noted that there had been 63 more or less total losses 
to .American vessels from fire 1n the previous two years 
and that 31 extra inspectors had been added as one of the 
measures to combat hazardous conditions; the meeting 
was called .to suggest further measures and leg1slations.82 
Stevenson Taylor, president of the .American Bureau 
of Shipping, remarked that the rebuilding of the Fall 
River liner PLYMOUTH in 1907 after her destruction by 
fire to the waterline had made her the most praot1cal 
type of fire resistant vessel. Rebuilding with an all 
steel superstructure, he said; would have been impractical, 
causing a fourteen•inch loss 0£ freeboard plus increased 
weigh.t.83 
w. o. Teague had said before the Society of Naval 
Architects and Marine Engineers two years before that 
it was practical to substitute steel for wood with a 
ten per cent rise in cost, wh1.oh ship01mers had wrongly 
oalled prohibitive. Warren T. Berry, however, at the 
meeting, had argued that the cost was far above Teague's 
estimates.84 
Non-flammable wood had been one other partial attempt 
some had proposed toward fire safety even before the 
I 
82. Advisory Conference, 1•4. 
83. Advi.sory Conference, 7 • 
84, w. o. Teague, "Safety of Life From Fire at Sea", 
Transactions of t}le Socyety of Naval Architects and 
Marine Engineers, XXII 1914), 35, 38. 
PLYMOUTH re.building. 85 Asbestos and paper pulp boards 
were other alternatives to ordinary wood. E. E. 
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Olcott, of the Hudson River Day Line. cited at the advisorif 
oonterenoe that asbestos had been usei on the crew areas 
of the new WASHINGTON IRVING,. but that this material was 
heavy and brittle; steel casing had been used over wood 
as a substitute device.86 
Engineering journalists were enthusiastic about the 
IRVING. The use of fire resistant construction had 
been "wherever practical usage will permit • " . . , 
places as fire rooms, the galley, and so on. uThe 
in such 
risk of fire on such a vessel is reduced to practically 
nil," the same ·report oont,µued. 87 
1'he one previous experiment with fttrther fireproofing 
.. 
had been the JAMESTOWN, called all-steel, but actually 
with as muoll steel as technology at that time had known 
how to install. This made her ten per cent heavier, though 
her deoks were still of wood, but encased in metal. Her 
builder, William Gatewood of Newport News Shipbuilding 
and Drydock Corporation, oame out flatly and stated that 
nothing further on fireproofing excursion boats past the 
JAMESTOWN would be praotioal, though he declined to call 
-· 
86. Advisory Conference, 9. 
her strictly a fireproof ahip.88 
Bulkheads were another prime top1o introduced in 
the advisory oonf'erence first in the matter of the 
PLn10UT~, whioh had been equipped with two transverse 
bulkheads for fire proteo.t1on when rebuilt, w1 th doors 
at the ends of her engine and boiler enclosures and in 
saloon passages~ Gatewood countered tho. t Ne1i'port News 
opposed fire doors on day liners as an obstacle to 
firefighting and movement of people rather than as a 
buffer to stop fires at bullcheads.89 Ships of' the 
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time were generally built ·with the main cargo deck open 
the entire length of the ship; fire could spread to 
all areas through the hatch covers at any point; the 
engine rooms were not always "bulkheaded off from the 
rest of the sh!p .• 9° 
At this. par~icular time. the United States had 
been recommending at i:u.ternationai meetings that 
flammable materials be 1cept at least a foot from either 
side of metal· subdivision bulkheads in ships carrying 
·' s7. "Hud~on River Steamer Washillgton Irving" t 
I;qtema1(io;qa:J. r~arine. Engineering, .XVII (July, 1913>, 276. 
88. Advisory Conference, 14, 15. 
, 89 •. . Advisory .. oonrerence, 8, 15 • 
90. Letter, E. J. Tracy to Author, March 4, 1961. 
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cargo as a measure against heat conducted through meta1.91 
· PLYMOUTH had had sprinlclers throughout when rebuilt; 
these were attached. to th9 firo pump syotem, ·which · 
featured separate lines to eaoh station from the pumps, 
·so that: if one fire station's line uas.brokon, it could 
be shut off independent ~of .. 1.ihe rest of the system. 92 . 
Use of aprlliklera engendered more oontroversy 
among.ship operators and builders then any other fire 
safet1 matter during the period.· There were aotua1ly 
three points of view we have been able to discern; 
first, there was, of oourse, a party opposed to all 
sprinkler syste.ms. Then there was the controversy 
between the "Wet.system" (having water in the sprinkler 
lines at all times; under pressure), and the "Dry 
System'' (in which an engineer turned water into lines . 
feeding sprinklers which were always open, upon alarm 
of fire). 
An a tta'ck on sprinklers was made 1n the discussion 
on w. o. Teague's paper cited above by Warren T. Berry 
and w. D. Forbes 1n 1914. Teague had stated that 
sprinklers cost about four dollars each, and 13erry 
oountered that the cost was more like seven dollars; he 
. 91. Informal London 09nference, November-December . 
1921 Sat:et:r of Life at Sea "Copied from Document obtained 
from 1 files of State Department 580.7A1/213" {Washington: 
·United States Shipping Board, mimeograph MSS, 1928), 4B. 
92. Advisory ·oonfer~nce, 8. 
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argUe'd that cargo breaks off sprinkler heads and is likely 
to damage the ship and its contents 1.f filled with water. 
Forbes backed him by aaying that Captain Francis Inch of 
the· VOLTurum had told him that spr1n..1tlers would not have 
helped in his case because the fire was guarded by l~yers 
of cargo from any firefightinG from overhead. He compared 
sprinklers to "spit on a match" and said their usefulness 
was liinited to small fires, advocating instead a simple 
perforated pipe dry system tied to a thermostat.93 
Scientific .American, on the other hand, said, "Why is 
it that the automatic sprinkler, which has ~roved so 
highly efficient ashore, ha.s not been applied to the 
protection of sh1ps?0 94 
However the arguments might have raged, a rule of 
the Board of Supervising Inspectors made April 8, 1916 
required sprinlclers and metal sheathing of exposed areas.95 
By 1919 insurance authors were bola enough to say that 
the United States had better firefighting equipment than 
the Europeans, and that automatic sprinklers were the 
principal reason. Until forced by the rule, naval architects 
had .failed to adapt sprinklers suooess.f'ully to ships beoause 
ot the danger ot water damage from damage to the sprinlclers, 
using the movement of cargoes and the wrenohing of a hull 
93.. W. O. Teague, .2.14• c1 t., 45-lf6. 
94. Soientif1o American, October 25, 19131 19..9.· c\t. 
during rough weather. The com:promise was a dry system 
1.n which a thermostat 1n a hold or other closed place 
activated a.n automatic fire pump, whioll fed uate:t" into 
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a sprinkler system in which the sprinkler heads were always 
open to a possible flow of water. Shipowners, however, 
continued to minimize the value of such devices.96 
Cigarettes bore, as they still do, the biggest blame 
for ship fires at the time. The Hudson River Day Line 
representative at the advisory meeting a·tressed that 
no matter how fire resistant a ship was, ·the smelting 
habit was the uncontrollable factor.97 One old shipping 
hand put it to the author this rray: 
ttThe main difficulty with fires aboard ship is 
the cigarette fires, A large percentage of such 
fires could be avoided if those confounded coffin 
nails were completely banished." 98 
Teague listed smoking as one of his principal five 
causes· of .f'ira 1 along w1 th .:spon·ta.neous combustion, 
volatile oils, ltoodwork in contact with steam pipes, 
and def act1 ve ·wiring. 99 · 
Tobacco 1s not the ·only human problem necessary to 
{ 
discuss; it falls as only part of the matter of concerned 
95, Advisory Conference, 24. 
96. The Eas~exn Und~r;-rriter, Marine Edition, 
J~uary ·31, 1919, 29. 
97. Advisory Conf6reuce, 10. 
98. Letter, J. 1\.. Bossen to author, January 10, 1961. 
99. w. o. Teague, .2l2.• ~., 34. 
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at'tention to the aims of. fire prevention at ell levels. 
E. c. Bennett of the Fore Rive~ Shipbuilding Corporation 
brought this out at the aa.visory meetine: thls l-ray-: 
"We have not ye.t found in building boa ts at 
Fore River a sh1pormer·who paid extraordinary 
attention to fire prevention, other than that 
required by the United States supervising in-
speo·~ors and clo.ss!.i'lo_a tion societies. 0 1 
The Fall River Line, its representative pointed out 
at the advisory meeting, had mu1nta1ned a better than 
average record of fire safety; he attributed this to 
an administrative policy of" constant fire drills a.nd 
inspeotions.2 
Andrew Furuseth, phlegmatic Seamen'a Unlon president, 
advocated a call bell operated from bridg~ to crew quar.ters 
to more effectively rouse men to fig,ht a fire, since ships 
1n that period were getting larger and communications more 
difficult due to distance. Furuseth threw in the comment here 
that it was the cargo and not the ship itself that most 
frequently bit.rned.3 
Statistics showed that Furuseth was substan.t1ally 
correct in this latter statement. In a survey of United 
States ship fires from 1911 to mid-1920, it was found 
that 65% started balo1'1 dec~s, and of these, 72% were in 
--
1. Advisory Conference, 19. 
2. Advisory Conference, 8. . 
3. Advisory Conference, 51. 
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cargoes. Yet, though fire alarms l'Tere required, there 
is evidence that the inspectors in practice did not 
require them in cargo areas,4 
Stowage of cargo so as to prevent spontaneous com-
bustion 1n cargoes and 1'al1-important" patrols of 
out-of-the•way parts of the ship had long bee~ urged 
as the easier way to prevent large fires; by catching 
them small.5 Control of small fires before they got 
too ~arge t_9 fight was the subject of several papers. 
Sachs called for buckets and hand pu.~pa a3 the most 
effective preventive to keep small fires from spread1ng.9 
The principal recommendation on .fire safety at the 
international shipping conference of 1928, in faot, 1-raa 
the calling for sand or other dry material to be kept 
in the stokehold of oil-burning steamers to smother 
011 fires lL~ely to start there.7 
The Rich System of !'ire deteotion was hailed as a 
great adva.noe at the time; it consisted of a series of 
pipes from each compartment of the ship to a box in the 
pilot house. This box had a glass front and an outlet 
1nto the are within the pilot house. Through the O:t>ening, 
4. R. G. Skerrett, "Fire s. t Sea", Scientific Ai11erica.n, 
CXXVII (August, 1922)t 81. 
5.· Sachs, .2.U• oit., 276. 
6. ~·· 276. 
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smolce from the holds· could pass into ·the pilot house 
and be smelled, alerting -Che officer on Cf.uty, wh() could 
look into the box and see which pipe, and thus which 
hold, smoke was coming from. He could. then, through the 
same pipe, send steam by a valve system into the hold. 8 
Steam for fire extiLguishing was an old standby; in 
1914 the Stearaboat .. Inspection Service was calli113 it 
the best way to fight a fire in. a hold, be·t ter tb.an 
flooding, which caused a stability problem, or gases, 
wh1oh llad not yet proven their worth.9 
Carbon dioxide as a smothering agent bad been widely 
suggested, but was not as simple to proylde as steam. 
One solution 1-re.s to install carbon dioxide generators. 10 
Another contemporary idea liUS to carry the carbon dioxide 
gas in forty-~of:md tubest one for each thousand cubic 
feet of air space enclosed L'l holds; Teague held that 
this gas was impractical to manufacture on a ship, but 
that sulphur dioxide as a smothering agent had been 
made and used success.fully on ships at sea. 11 
United States Shippi...~g Bo~rd, Sa~et3 ot ~1~~ 
E::::tr~cts from D~scussions, Reports, an~ ,Res-
Shipping Board, 1928), 27. 
8. Skerrett; Jlll• 0,1t.; cf. F. S. Ti'tsworth, address 
before Marine Insurance Club1 Wc.ldcrf•.!storia Hotel, Mew 
York, April 12, 1920, 4-5· 
9. Teague, .2Jl• cit., 36. 
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Yet, with all this discussion 011 1·rhat makes a ship 
fire-safe, it is appropriate to 'note that about ·cwenty 
years after the advisory coni'erence, t'i1e HOR.tl.O C.d.S TLE 
burned. Though she had been a new ship, her furnishings, 
panelings, and staircases were of combustible material; 
. she ·was open through _stairwells between decks, a· feature 
which made these escape routes into chimneys instead. 
She had all the required extinguishers and alarms, but 
the latter were not in the public areas where the fire 
'. 
got 1 ts headway. Carbon dioxi.de outlets were located in 
the holds and engine spaces only and there were no 
sprinklers. Result: fire got its headway 1n the writing 
room and the ship was lost. 12 
Even though such abuses were permitted even after the 
peri~d under study, the .fatality rate for American seamen 
in 1917 was still only three per thousand as compared to 
' 13 the British rate of five per thousand. 
10,, J. E .. w. Currier, "Fire in Ships and its Pre-
vention", ~c1entit+c .American, XCVII(July 20, 1907), 47. 
11. Teague, ou. c~-f{ .• , 38. 
12. Franlt Rushbroolc, Fire Apoard (London: Technical 
Press. 1961), 52. 
13. F. L. Hoffman, ''The Aooide~t Haza.rd ~ the 
Americs..n Marchand Marine", !fat;tona~. ).Jafety ConP.:I ess 
P;:gceeq1ngs, New York, September 1 , 1917, 602. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY Alm CONCLUSIONS G.AIMED FRON THIS STUDY 
Since the na·ture or this study ·was political, economic, 
and technical, there have been quite a few f1t,ru.res studied 
in attempting to gain a picture .of advances made 1.n a ·very 
human problem: safety of life fr~m fire at sea. In such 
a study1 then, it seems meet for the final chapter to deal 
with the hrtman values~. 
But before we go into purely human aspects, there 
are two appended tables here to study, ·which are by way 
of Slllmlla.ries• The first; a chart of losses by fire for 
the first decade of ~he period under atudy, is interesting 
in that the total number of fires for 1905 was identical 
to the number for 1914; there were more lives lost per 
year, .with one exception, toward the encl of the decade 
than in the earlier part. Oontrest this 1·ri th the erowth 
0£ the persomiel of .the Steamboat-Inspection Servioe, and 
a question is sure to arise. That question is: 
In the light of these two charts, and oonaidering 
the facts previously presented in this study, can 
1 t be said that there 1-TaS a.ctu~lly any progress made 
in the general field of m.ak:1ng .American shipping as 
a whole secure from loss by fire? 
Since this study at the outset was predicated on the 
. id.ea that there was indeed action d~ring the period, 
especiaJ.ly after the SLOCffi.1 fire, thio is the question 
which must be at least tentatively answered by this paper. 
CHART OF LOSSES BY FIRE TO AMERICAN VESSELS, 1905-14,, COMPILED FOR THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NAVAL ARCHITECTS AND MARINE ENGINERRS, NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
PERIOD ENDED iLA.::1::1 ~ :zJ::S:!Eit.· STEAM YACHT MISCELLANEOUS TOTAL LIVES LOST PROPERTY \-OSS EXPLOSIONS 
iisENGER FREIGHT TOW FERRY MOTORS HIP (PLEASURE) VESSELS -- PASS. CREW GAS BOILER 
12/31/05 8 9 16 3 1 3 0 40 0 3 $554,000 2 l 
12/31/06 7 8 17 l 0 1 0 34 0 6 1,893,000 0 l 
12/31/07 19 25 26 l 3 2 0 76 23 lA 1,567 ,ooo 6 1 
12/31/08 4 22 19 l 1 0 3 50 0 3 666,000 l 1 
12/31/09 11 23 14 0 2 0 1 51 0 14 1, 294,000 0 1 
12/31/10 13 15 16 1 3 2 2 52 0 7 1,055,000 0 0 
12/31/11 14 12 9 1 2 1 0 39 0 8 732,000 0 1 
6/30/12 4 6 6 1 1 0 0 18 0 3 237,000 0 0 
f ,:j 6/30/13 6 12 11 1 2 2 1 35 2 5 1,120,000 1 0 
t j 6/30/14 13 17 8 (?) 1 1 0 0 40 1 9 649,000 3 0 
...: 
TOTALS: 99 149 -142 11 16 11 7 435 26 76 $9,767,000 13 6 
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In the first chapter; we retraced some of the high 
points of fire safety rules up to the period under study; 
there, e.s well e.s in the body of the pa.per proper, a 
significant trend was disoernable of action follouiu,.. 
u 
most frequently upon public in~ignation or concern in the 
walte of some spectaou.lar disaster. We have mentio~ed the 
L:SX:IllGTON 1 GRIFFITH, SLOCUM, TITANIC, VOLTTJRNO, nnd 
EASTLAlID disasters and the uproc.rs ·which followed them. 
But 1 t has also been sho1m how the legisla ~ion which 
follorred ea.ch of these disasters was not n. now· idea at the 
time, but an enactment of one principle or another tll~t 
the experts and safety men had been calling for previouoly. 
Furthermore, it ha.a been significant to note durin0 the 
period under study that the enactments of Conercos did not 
represent the solutions to the problems 2s recommended; 
but were only as much as \ms necessary to placa tc the 
voters. 
~nis brings up the question of pressure groups of 
shipowners and bu1l{lers.• What :pe.rt did they pl~y in 
retardlng legislation ·which !'.11C,'J,_t prove costly to them? 
Clues to this matter might come from the statements 1n 
connection with the sprinkler controversy; purely safety-
minnad writers were ·advocating sprtnklers, as ue have 
shown, long before they were reg_v.ired by law. 1·lhen the 
law fina.lly dicl require these aevices; the shfpowners found 
I_ 
PERSONNEL 
OF THE STEAMBOAT-INSPECTION SERVICE FOR JUNE 30 OF YEARS SHOWN, 
compiled by the author !'rom the annual reports 01' the supervising 
inspector-general, National Archives, MSS and printed reports. 
1919 - 385 
1918 - 321 
1914 - 266 1915 - 267 
• 
-
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ways to install them without bankrupting themselves. 
Indications or a motor vessel lobby, whether formal 
or informal, appear in the repeated attempts of the 
Steamboat-Inspection Service to get authority at least 
to assure the minimum safety standards on such vessels. 
Because there were no serious disasters on motor vessels 
in 11h1ch these inadequacies cost any great nunber of' 
lives, the Supervising Inspector-General mi~ht just ao 
well have been tallcing to a stone 1~all. 
Corruption in lower levels was evidently rn..rnpant, 
from some or the indications. We note the findincs of 
the inquiries after the GENERAL SLOCU:-! fire in 1·rhich 
inspectors themselves we~e found very culpable. Grosvenor's 
statement about ships going to 1-There inspection was most 
lax would tend to raise a question about the honesty of 
the execution of what laws there were. Inspector-General 
Uhlert on the other hand, nppears to be more sincere than 
his field sta.f.f. However, :tn readin1:; the quarter century 
of his reports, one cannot help but sense an air or futile 
pleading against ~dds. 
But the question as posed is whether or not George 
Uhler left the ine~ection and safety of .American steamers 
in any better state in1en he retired 1n 1925 than they ha.d 
been 111 when the GEifE.R.AL SLOOUM bu.rned. Our considered 
conclusion would be a conditional "yes". On paper, the 
47 
situation was comparat1vely excellent beside 1rha+. 1t had 
been in 1904. But even "ff! th these improvements, the human 
errors or deliberate indifference to safe practice were 
enough to cause the MORRO CASTLE fire, or more r~cently 
the U. S. S. 08.NSTELLATION or H .. illINE SULPHUR QUEEM di:msters. 
Perhaps the best summary of the human fcc~or in 
saf'ety is made by Edmund A. Walsh, t·rho besides being a 
marine expert, is a priest and probably t10!"C lili:cly to 
be sensitive to this matter: 
"No amount of inanimate equipment in steel, 
fireproofed wood or asbestos can replace 
leadersh1~, clear thinki.ng and iron in the souls 
of man."14 
4 Edmund A. Walsh, s. J., phins and N~tional Safety 
· (Washin~tons Georgetown Un1versity School of .Eoreign Service, 
1934)' 51. 
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